The language of scene descriptions 2 must allow a hearer to build structures of schemas similar (to some level of detail) to those the speaker has built via perceptual processes.
The understanding process in general requires a hearer to create and run "event ~"
to check the consistency and plausibility of a "picture" constructed from a speaker's description. A speaker must also run similar event simulations on his own descriptions in order to be able to judge when the hearer has been given sufficient information to construct an appropriate "picture", and to be able to respond appropriately to the heater's questions about or responses to the scene description. to them and what information must be found or generated to account for the inferences we know are actually made.
THE PROBLEM AREA
An entity (human or computer) that could be said to fully understand scene descriptions would have to have a broad range of abilities.
For example, it would have to be able to make predictions about likely futures; to judge certain scene descriptions to be implausible or impossible; to point to items in a scene, given a description of the scene; and to say whether or not a scene description corresponded to a given scene experienced through other sensory modes. 3 In general, then, the entity would have to have a sensory system that it could use to generate scene representations to be compared with scene representations it had generated on the basis of natural language input.
In this paper I concentrate on I) the problems of making appropriate predictions and inferences about described scenes, and 2) the problem of judging when scene descriptions are physically implausible or impossible.
I do not consider directly problems that would require a vision system, problems such as deciding whether a linguistic scene description is appropriate for a perceived scene, or generating lingulstic scene descriptions from visual input, or learning scene description lar4uage through experience.
I also do not consider speech act aspects of scene descriptions in much detail here.
I believe that the principles of speech acts transcend topics of language; I am not convinced that the study of scene descriptions would lead to major insights into speech acts that couldn't be as well gained through the study of language in other domains. ($I) I saw the man on the hill with my own eyes. (32) I saw the man on the hill with a telescope. ($3) I saw the man on the hill with a red ski mask.
The well-known sentence $2 is truly ambiguous, but $I and $3, while likely to be treated as syntactically similar to $2 by current parsers, are each relatively unambiguous; I would like to be able to explain how a system can choose the appropriate parsings in these cases, as well as how a sequence of sentences can add constraints to a single scene-centered representation, and aid in disamDiguation. For example, if given the pair of sentences:
($2) I saw the man on the hill with a telescope. ($4) I cleaned the lens to get a better view of him. a language understanding system should be able to select the appropriate reading of $2.
I would also like to explore mechanisms that would be appropriate for judging that ($5) My dachshund bit our mailman on the ear.
requires an explanation (dachshunds could not jump high enough to reach a mailman's ear, and there is no way to choose between possible scenarios which would get the dachsund high enough or the mailman low enough for the biting to take place). The mechanisms must also be able to judge that the sentences: A few words about the importance of explanation are in order here.
If a program could judge correctly which scene descriptions were plausible and wnich were no5, but could not explain why it made the judgements it did, I think I would feel profoundly dissatisfied with and suspicious of the program as a model of language comprehension.
A program ought to consider the "right options" and decide among them for the "right reasons"a if it is to be taken seriously as a model of cognition.
! will argue that scene descriptions are often most naturally represented by structures which are, at least in part, only awkwardly viewed as propositional; such representations include coordinate systems, trajectories, and event-simulating mechanisms, i.e. procedures w~ich set up models of objects, interactions, and constraints, "set them in motion", and "watch what happens". I suggest that event simulations are supported by mechanisms that model common-sense physics and human behavior I will also argue that there is no way to put limits on the degree of detail which may have to be considered in constructing event simulations; virtually any feature of an object can in the right circumstances become centrally important.
4An explanation need not be in natural language; for example, I probably could be convinced via traces of a program's operation that it had been concerned with the right issues in judging scene plausibility. Dynamic scene descriptions can use detail addition also, but more co-,-only they use either the mechanisms of "successive refinement" [3] or "temporal addition". "Temporal addition" refers to the process of describin 6 events through a series of tlme-ordered static scene descriptions, as in: 
THE GOALS OF A SCENE UNDERSTANDING SYSTEM
What should a scene description understanding system to do with a linguistic scene description?
Basically I) verify plausIDillty, 2) make inferences and predictions, 3) act if action is called for, and a) remember whatever is important.
For the time being, I am only considering I) and 2) in detail.
In order to carry out I) and 2), I
would llke my system to turn scene descriptions (statiu or dynamic) into a time sequence of "expanded spatial analog models", where each expanded spatial analog model represents either I) a set of spatial relationships (as in $12-$15), or 2) spatial relationships plus models of actions in progress, chosen from a fairly large set of primitive actions (see below), or 3) prototypical actions that can stand for sequences of primitive actions.
These prototypical actions would have to be fitted into the current context, and modified according to the dictates of the objects and modifiers that were supplied in the scene description.
The action prototype would have associated selection restrictions for objects; if the objects in the scene description matched the selection restrictions, then there would be no need to expand the prototype into primitives, and the "before" and "after" scenes (similar to pro-and post-condltions) of the action prototype could be used safely.
If the selection restrictions were violated by objects in the scene, or if modifiers were present, or if the context did not match the preconditions, then it would have to be possible to adapt the action prototype "appropriately".
It would also have to be possible to reason abOut the action without actually running the event simulation sequence underlying it in its entirety; sections that would have to be modified, plus before and after models, might be the only portions of the simulation actually run. The rest of the prototype could be treated as a kind of "black box" with known input-output characteristics. As an example of the expansion of a non-primitive action into primitive actions, consider "bite x y"; its steps are: 1)[set-up] instantlate x ~ as a "biting-thing" --defaults = mouth, teeth, jaws of an animate entity; 2) instantiate y as "thlng-bitten"; 3) [before] x is open and does not touch y and x partially surrounds y (i.e. y is not totally Inside x); ~) x is closing on y; 5) [actlon] x is touching y, preferably in two places on opposite sides of y and x continues to close; 6) x deforms y; 7)falter] x is moving away from y, and no longer touches y. that an entity may not be able to "imagine" such an object.
As the examples below illustrate, sometimes an event simulation simply cannot be set up because information is missing, or several possible "pictures" are equally plausible, or the objects and actions being described cannot be fitted together for a variety of reasons, or the results of running the simulation do not match our knowledge of the world or the following portions of the scene description, and so on.
It is also important to empbaclze that our ultimate interest is in being able to succeed in setting up and running event simulations; therefore I have for the most part chosen ambiguous examples where at least one event slmuiation succeeds.
TRANSLATING AN OLD EXAMPLE INTO NEW MECHANISMS
Consider Bar-Hillel's famous sentence [4]: 6 ($I0) The box is in the pen.
Plausibility Judgement is necessary to choose the appropriate reading, i.e. that "pen" = playpen. Minor extensions to Boggess's program could allow it to choose • the appropriate referent for pen. Penl (the writing implement) would be defined as having a relatively fixed size (subject to being overridden by modifiers, as in "tiny pen" or "twelve inch pen"), but the size of cen2 (the enclosure) would be allowed to vary over a range of values (as would the size of box).
The program could attempt to model the sentence by instantlatlng standard (default-sized) models of box, penl, and pen2, and attempting to assign the objects to positions in a coordinate system such that the box would be in peril or pen2.
Pen; could not take part in such a spatial analog model both because of pen1's rigid size, and the extreme shrinkage that would be required of box (outside box's allowed range) to make it smaller than the pen;, and also because pen; is not a container (i.e. hollow object).
Pen2 and box prototypes could be fitted together without problems, and could thus be chosen as the most appropriate interpretation.
A SIMPLE EVENT SIMULATION
Extending Boggess's program to deal with most of the other examples given in this paper so far would be harder, although I believe that $I-$4 could be handled without too much difficulty. Let us look at $2 and S~ in more detail:
($2) I saw the man on the hill with a telescope. ($4) I cleaned the lens to get a better view of him.
After being told $2, a system would either pick one of the possible interpretations as most plausible, or it might be unable to choose between competing interpretations, and keep them both. When it is told $4, the system must first discover that "the lens" is part of the telescope. Having done this, $4 unambiguously forces the placement of the speaker to be close enough to the telescope to touch it. This is because all common interpretations of clean require the agent to be close to the object. At least two possible interpretations still remain: I) the speaker is distant from the man on the hill, and is using the telescope to view the man; or 2) the speaker, telescope, and man on the hill are all close together.
The phrase "to get a better view of him" refers to the actions of the speaker in viewing the man, and thus makes interpretation I) much more likely, but 2) is still conceivable. The reasoning necessary to choose I) as most plausible is rather subtle, involving the idea that telescopes are usually used to look at distant objects.
In any case, the proposed mechanisms should allow a system to discard an interpretatllon of $2 and S~ where the man on the hill had a telescope and was distant from the speaker.
6A central figure in the machine translation effort of the late 5O's and early 6O's, Bar-Hillel cited this sentence in explaining why machine translation was impossible.
He subsequently quit the field.
SIMULATING AN IMPLAUSIBLE EVENT
Let us also look again at $5:
($5) My dachshund bit our mailman on the ear. 2) analyze the preconditions for "bite" to find that they require the dog's mouth to surround the mailman's ear;
3) see whether the dachshund's mouth can reach the mailman's ear directly (no); ~) see whether the dog can stretch high enough to reach (no; this test would require an articulated model of the dog's skeleton or a prototypical representation of a dog on its hind legs.); 5) see whether a dachshund could jump high enough (no; tbls step is decidedly non-trivial to implement!" ); 6) see whether the mailman ordinarily gets into any positions w~ere the dog could reach his ear (no); 7) conclude that the mailman could not be bitten as stated unless default sizes or movement ranges are relaxed in some way. Since there is no clearly preferred way to relax the defaults, more information is necessary to make this an "unambiguous" description.
I have quoted "unambiguous" because the sentence $5 is not ambiguous in any ordinary sense, lexically or structurally.
What is ambiguous are the conditions and actions whlch could have led up to $5. Strangely enough, the ordinary actions of mailmen (checked in step 6) seem relevant to the judgement of plausibility in this sentence.
As evidence for this analysis, note that the substitution of "gardener" for "mailman" turns ($5) into a sentence that can be simulated without problems. I think that it is significant that such peripheral factors can be influential in Judging the plausibility of an event.
At the same time, I am aware that the effect in this case is rather weak, that people can accept this sentence without noting any strangeness, so I do not want to draw conclusions that are too strong.
~.4 MAKING INFERENCES ABOUT SCENES
Consider the following passage:
YOU are at one end of a vast hall stretching forward out of sight to the west.
There are openings to either side.
Nearby, a wide stone staircase leads downward.
The hall is filled with wisps of white mist swaying to and fro almost as if alive.
A cold wind blows up the staircase. There is a passage at the top of the dome behind you.
Rough stone steps lead up the d~e.
Given this passage (taken from the computer game "Adventure") one can infer that it is possible to move to the west, north, south, or east (up the rough stone steps).
Note that this information is buried in the description; in order to infer this information, it would be useful to construct a spatial analog model, TAltbough one could do it by simply including in the definition of a dog information about how high a dog can Jump, e.g. no higher than twice the dog's length. However I consider tbls something of a "hack", because it iKnores some other problems, for example the timing problem a dog would face in biting a small target like a person's ear at the apex of its highest jump.
I would prefer a solution that could, if necessary, perform an event simulation for step 5), rather than trust canned data.
with "you" facing west, and the scene features placed appropriately.
In playing Adventure, it is also necessary to remember salient features of the scenes described so that one can reoo@~Lize the same room later, given a passage such as: (P2) You're in hall of mists.
Rough stone steps lead up the dome. There is a threatening little dwarf in the room with you.
Adventure
can only accept a very limited class of co-v, ands from a player at any given point in the game.
It is only
possible to play the game because one can make reasonable inferences about what actions are possible at a given point, i.e. take an object, move in s~e direction, throw a knife, open a door, etc. While I am not quite sure what make of my observations about this example, I think that games such as Adventure are potentially valuable tools for gathering information about the kinds of spatial and other inferences people make about scene descriptions.
MIRACLES AND WORLD RECORDS
With some sentences there may be no plausible interpretation at all. In many of the examples which follow, it seems unlikely that we actually generate (at least consciously) an event simulation.
Rather it seems that we have some shortcuts for recognizing that certain events would have to be termed "miraculous" or difficult to believe. The Gulnness Book of World Records is full of examples that defy event simulation.
How one is able to Judge the plausibility of tsese (and how we ml~ht get a system to do so) remains s~methl~ of a mystery to me.
The problem of recognizing obviously implausible events rapidly is an important one to consider for dealing with pronouns.
Often we choose the appropriate referent for a pronoun because only one of the possible referents could be part of a plausible event if substituted for the pronoun. For example, "it" must refer to "milk", not "baby", in 329:
($29) I didn't want the baby to get sick from drinking the milk, so I boiled it.
T~ ROLK OF EVKNT SIMULATION IN A FULu T~ORY OF
LA.CUAC~ I suggested in section 3 that a scene description understanding system would have to 1) verify the plausibility of a described scene, 2) make inferences or predlction~ about the scene, 3) act if action is called for, and ~) remember whatever is important.
As pointed out in section ~.5, event simulations may not even be need for all cases of plausibility judgement. Furthermore, scene descriptions constitute only one of many possible topics of language.
Nonetheless, I feel that the study of event simulation is extremely important.
WHY ARE SIMPLE PHYSICAL SCENES WORTH CONSIDERING?
For a number of reasons, methodological as well as theoretical, I believe that it is not only worthwhile, but also important to begin the study of scene descriptions with the world of simple physleai objects, events, and physical behaviors with simple goals. I) Methodologically it is necessary to pick an area of concentration which is restricted in some way. The world of simple physical objects and events is one of the simplest worlds that links language and sensory descriptions.
2) As argued in the work of Piaget [5] , it seems likely that we come to comprehend the world by first mastering the sensory/motor world, and then by adapting and building on our schemata from the sensory/motor world to understand progressively more abstract worlds. In the area of language Jackendoff
[6] offers parallel arg,~eents. Thus the world of simple physical objects and behaviors has a privileged positions in the development of cognition and language.
3) Few words in English are reserved for describing the abstract world only. Most abstract words also have a physical meaning.
In some cases the physical meanings may provide important metaphors for understanding the abstract world, w~ile in other cases the same mechanisms that are used in the interpretation of the physical world may be shared with mechanisms that interpret the abstract world. 4) I would llke the representations I develop for linguistic scene descriptions to be compatible with representations I can imagine generating with a vision system.
Thus this work does have an indirect bearing on vision research: my representations characterize and put constraints on the types and forms of information I think a vision system o~nt to be able to supply. 5) Even in the physical domain, we must come to grips with some processes that resemble those involved in the generation and understanding of metaphor: matching, adaptation of schemata, ~diflcation of stereotypical items to match actual items, and the interpretation of items from different perspectives.
SCENE D~SCRIPTIONS AND A THEORY OF ACTION
I take it as evident that every scene description, indeed every utterance, is associated with some purpose or goal of a speaker. The speaker's purpose affects the organization and order of the speaker's presentation, the items included and the items omitted, as well as word choice and stress. Any two witnesses of the same event will in general give accounts of it that differ on every level, especially if one or both witnesses were participants or ~as some special interest in the cause or outcome of the event.
For now I have ignored all these factOrS of scene description understanding; I have not attempted an account of the deciphering of a speaker's goals or biases from a given scene description. I have instead considered only the propositional content of scene description utterances, in particular the issue' of whether or not a given scene description could plausibly correspond to a real scene. Until we can give an account of the Judgement of plausibility of description meanings, we cannot even say now we recognize blatant lles; from this perspective, understanding ~ someone might lle or mislead, i.e. understanding the intended effect of an utterance, is a secondary issue.
There seems to me to be a clear need for a "theory of human action", both for purposes of event simulation and, more importantly, to provide a better overall framework for AI research than we currently nave. While no one to my knowledge still accepts as plausible the "big switch" theory of intelligent action [7] , mos~ AI work seems to proceed on the "big switch" ass,,mptions that it is valid to study intelligent behavior in isolated domains, and that there is no compelling reason at this point to worry a~out whether (let alone how) the pieces developed in isolation will ultimately fit together.
ARE THERE MANY WAYS TO SKIN % CAT?
Spatial analog models are certainly not the only possible representation for scene descriptions, hut they are convenient and natural in many ways. Among their advantages are: I) computational adequacy for representing the locations and motions of objects; 2) the ability to implicitly represent relationships between objects, and to allow easy derivation of these relationships; 3) ease of interaction with a vision system, and ultimately appropriateness for allowing a mobile entity to navlgate and locate objects.
The main problem with these representations is that scene descriptions are usually underspeclfled, so that there is a range of possible locations for each object. It thus becomes risky to trust implicit relationships between objects. Event stereotypes are probably important because they specify compactly all the important relationships between objects. and Rieger [14] . Johnson-Laird [15] has investigated problems in understanding scenes with spatial locative prepositions, as has Herskovits [16] . Recent work by Forbus [17] has developed a very interesting paradigm for qualitative reasoning in physics, built on work by deKleer [18, 19] , and related to work by Hayes [20, 21] . My comments on pronoun resolution are in the same spirit as Hobbs [22] , although Hobbs's "predicate interpretation" is quite different from my "analog spatial models".
5.~
Ideas on the adaptation of prototypes for the representation of 3-D shape were explored in Waltz [23] . A effort toward qualitative mechanics is described in Bundy [24] . Also relevant is the work on mental imagery of Kosslyn & Shwartz [25] and Hinton [26] .
